Boeing needs to improve quality-control work on SLS moon rocket, NASA Inspector General finds

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The report finds serious quality-control issues affecting the upgraded SLS version and expects cost overruns and delays.

two massive side booster spew yellow orange fire lifting the core stage of a rocket as two main engines also ignite
NASA's Space Launch System rocket launches the Artemis 1 mission, Nov. 16, 2022. (Image credit: Josh Dinner)

A scathing report from NASA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has highlighted several critical issues related to the development of the next version of the agency's Space Launch System megarocket, which will likely delay Artemis moon missions.

The report, released by NASA's internal watchdog on Aug. 8, focuses on the gigantic Space Launch System (SLS) Block 1B and its Exploration Upper Stage (EUS). Block 1B is designed to increase the amount of cargo SLS can carry to the moon. The upgraded version is key to NASA's long-term lunar plans and will be used for Artemis 4, currently scheduled to launch in 2028.

The OIG found that work being done by Boeing — the prime contractor for the SLS core and upper stages, as well as the rocket's flight avionics suite — at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans does not meet international standards or agency requirements. This has led to numerous Corrective Action Requests (CARs) issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). A CAR, which can vary in level of severity, indicates that work has not conformed to specific contract requirements.

According to the OIG report, these quality-control lapses at Michoud are "largely due to the lack of a sufficient number of trained and experienced aerospace workers at Boeing." The report criticizes Boeing's inadequate training and supervision efforts, which fail to mitigate these deficiencies, thereby raising serious concerns about the safety and reliability of the SLS components.

The report also notes growing cost estimates and suggests that Artemis 4 may not hit its expected September 2028 launch date due to such issues.

Related: Space Launch System: NASA's megarocket for Artemis moon missions

"We project SLS Block 1B costs will reach approximately $5.7 billion before the system is scheduled to launch in 2028. This is $700 million more than NASA's 2023 Agency Baseline Commitment, which established a cost and schedule baseline at nearly $5 billion," the OIG report states.

"EUS development accounts for more than half of this cost, which we estimate will increase from an initial cost of $962 million in 2017 to nearly $2.8 billion through 2028."

It states that Boeing's delivery of the EUS to NASA has so far been delayed from February 2021 to April 2027. These issues, when combined with other factors, suggest further delays, which would impact Artemis 4.

Boeing's response to these issues has also been found to be ineffective, particularly regarding recurrent quality-control problems.

The OIG's recommendations include developing a compliant quality management training program for Boeing and issuing financial penalties for Boeing's noncompliance with quality standards. A detailed cost overrun analysis on Boeing's EUS development contract is also suggested. NASA agreed with three of four recommendations, but did not agree to institute financial penalties for Boeing's noncompliance with quality-control standards.

Related Stories:

— NASA beefing up SLS moon rocket for its Artemis program

—  Astronauts won't walk on the moon until 2026 after NASA delays next 2 Artemis missions

— NASA inspector general finds Orion heat shield issues 'pose significant risks' to Artemis 2 crew safety 

The report is another blow to Boeing, whose Starliner spacecraft is currently under scrutiny following its unscheduled, extended stay docked at the International Space Station (ISS) while tests related to problematic reaction control thrusters continue. 

It is also another issue for NASA's Artemis program. The Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 missions — the latter being the planned first return of humans to the moon's surface — have this year already been pushed back to September 2025 and September 2026, respectively.

Meanwhile, Artemis' Orion spacecraft, which is built by Lockheed Martin, also faces some trouble. The NASA OIG issued a report in May on Orion heat shield issues, which could further impact the readiness for the Artemis 2 mission, which will send astronauts around the moon.

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Andrew Jones
Andrew Jones
Contributing Writer

Andrew is a freelance space journalist with a focus on reporting on China's rapidly growing space sector. He began writing for Space.com in 2019 and writes for SpaceNews, IEEE Spectrum, National Geographic, Sky & Telescope, New Scientist and others. Andrew first caught the space bug when, as a youngster, he saw Voyager images of other worlds in our solar system for the first time. Away from space, Andrew enjoys trail running in the forests of Finland. You can follow him on Twitter @AJ_FI.

13 Comments Comment from the forums
  • BobShumaker
    Admin said:
    A scathing report from NASA's Office of Inspector General has highlighted several critical issues related to the development of the next version of the agency's SLS moon rocket.

    Boeing needs to improve quality-control work on SLS moon rocket, NASA Inspector General finds : Read more
    In my humble opinion, NASA needs to jettison all projects dealing with Boeing. Their proven history of incomplete and hazardous work is a threat to human space travel.
    Reply
  • Mark3141
    Whether you like Boeing or not, this comes as a surprise to no one. I wonder if a criminal case can be made against certain Boeing execs.
    Reply
  • Dancquill
    Hiring, retention and quality control seems to be a big issue for Boeing. I would get rid of the HR department and start fresh with a new crew and hiring citeria.
    Reply
  • Unclear Engineer
    Clearly, Boeing management is to blame for Boeing slipping into its current state from its previous status of a proficient supplier of aerospace hardware. That needs to be changed.

    But, there is no guarantee that simply changing the upper managers is going to right the ship. The culture of the employees actually designing and making the products needs to be changed.

    If NASA decides to keep contracting with Boeing, I suggest that it includes "resident inspectors" at Boeing's design and fabrication facilities who have the authority to observe all meetings and activities and to speak directly with every employee. These inspectors should be specialists in the appropriate disciplines and should be assigned to specific NASA projects, coordinating among themselves and reporting monthly to NASA headquarters in joint reports that each inspector on a particular project signs. There needs to be no more surprises like the flammable electric tape and the deletion of already demonstrated capabilities by "firmware updates".
    Reply
  • Rob77
    Dancquill said:
    Hiring, retention and quality control seems to be a big issue for Boeing. I would get rid of the HR department and start fresh with a new crew and hiring citeria.
    Would be interesting to see how many (if any) staff may have gone over to SpaceX?
    Reply
  • Macadoodle
    There’s a shocker.
    Reply
  • fj.torres
    Unclear Engineer said:
    Clearly, Boeing management is to blame for Boeing slipping into its current state from its previous status of a proficient supplier of aerospace hardware. That needs to be changed.

    But, there is no guarantee that simply changing the upper managers is going to right the ship. The culture of the employees actually designing and making the products needs to be changed.

    If NASA decides to keep contracting with Boeing, I suggest that it includes "resident inspectors" at Boeing's design and fabrication facilities who have the authority to observe all meetings and activities and to speak directly with every employee. These inspectors should be specialists in the appropriate disciplines and should be assigned to specific NASA projects, coordinating among themselves and reporting monthly to NASA headquarters in joint reports that each inspector on a particular project signs. There needs to be no more surprises like the flammable electric tape and the deletion of already demonstrated capabilities by "firmware updates".
    A big part of the problem with their work culture is the old "flip it over the wall" assembly line mentality, especially with respect to subcontractors. "Do your assigned task and let the next guy figure it out". That stuff went out in most places in the '80's after Demming was lionized.

    Nobody seems to take ownership of the final product. You see it with Starliner issues; Boeing blames Rocketdyne, Rocketdyne blames Boeing for the design, both blame suppliers. And the issues come from things any competent QA dept would catch on the fly.

    And then there is the whole cost-plus mentality that leads to endless reworks ahd delays. Nobody cares about doing it right the first time to reduce cost because doing it three times simply means charging the government more and bigger billings means more profits.

    The new guy has his work cut out for him.

    (SpaceX, on the other hand, is used to fixed price contracts where cost control is essential. And Shotwell is a veteran of the auto industry. She understands modern manufacturing and so does SpaceX. People undervalue her importance to SpaceX.)
    Reply
  • Unclear Engineer
    Demming's lessons about quality seem to have been lost in the U.S. industrial base. Part of that may be from the off-shoring of so much of U.S. manufacturing to the cheapest source, where price has higher priority than quality and much control is lost at the basic production level.

    And, with U.S. brand names being bought by off-shore companies and applied to totally different designs and manufacturing practices, the value of brand names has plummeted.

    It is the "business community", including the college-level education processes, that have fostered the change. So, it is truly now a "culture". And, I suppose it will take another Demming to change that here, just as it took in Japan. The U.S. is not the only "Western" culture affected.
    Reply
  • DrRaviSharma
    Whatever it takes to improve upon cost over run and schedule problem such as systems engineering overview or safety with agility and smartness with enthusiasm are needed.
    Reply
  • bolide
    As a longtime resident of Seattle, Boeing's one time "company town," I remember when the company was well and proudly run by engineers. The merger with McDonnell-Douglas in the 90's brought in the Jack Welch cost-cutting corporate mentality, and priorities changed. We've been seeing the effects for a while now.
    Reply